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Abstract 
Mainstream parties in Europe (especially the Western part of Europe that is currently 
dealing with an increased migration flux in comparison with the rest of the European 
countries) seem to have intensified their concern with immigration in the last two 
decades (even more so since the 2008 financial crisis). Right-wing parties are the most 
radical in their anti-immigration discourse, and public displays of such argumentations 
reflect not only shifts in the public’s political sympathies post-crisis, but may also reflect 
shifts in the (still) dominant paradigm of multiculturalism.  This paper analyses some 
examples from various right-wing discourses (Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, to 
name a few) and from political discourses on the nature and future of multiculturalism in 
order to understand the way political actors rationalize such positions. This analysis can 
help further understand not only how the rhetorics of political justifications and 
rationalizations work, but also to sketch some plausible future dynamics of migration in 
European context (the main target of the paper being the discourses towards Eastern-
European immigrants) and the possible shifts in multiculturalism as well. 
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The two moments that fueled the anti-immigrant rhetoric (and a little historical 
context) 
An immigration-opposed discourse is traditionally associated with the right-wing parties 
in the political sphere. Such discourses have become more prominent in Western Europe 
after two recent turning points, in our opinion: first of all, the post-2000 enlargement 
waves of the European Union (EU) (namely, the 2004 accession of Central European 
countries and the 2007 accession of Eastern Balkan countries); and secondly, the 2008 
financial crisis. The enlargement of the European Union has made work migration very 
easy from eastern European countries to western ones, thus creating immigration waves 
of  unprecedented  size;  while  the  financial  crisis  has  made  even  the  low-skilled  jobs 
usually targeted by immigrants very sought out, creating thus more discontent towards 
the immigrants’ positioning on the unemployment-ridden job market.  
Our paper is aiming to answer –  or  at  least  to  further  deepen  –  two main 
questions in regard to these problems: how do political actors with a right-wing 
background  rationalize  and  argue  for  their  anti-immigrant  discourse;  and  what  is 
currently happening with  multiculturalism?  Our  focus  will  be  identifying  the  kind  of 
motives given in the anti-immigrant rhetoric and analyzing their construction, on one 
hand,  and  sketching  possible  future  changes  of  perspective  towards  and  within  the 
broader paradigm of multiculturalism.  
As shown in Van der Valk (2003) and Faist (1994), the anti-immigrant discourse 
was already mainstreaming back in the 90s and is not solely a post-2000s political trend 
based on the two key-moments we suggested above. According to the works referenced 
above – that come from a critical discourse studies perspective which can be useful to 
sociology and anthropology if they are to understand the more subtle implications of the 
thought movements that fuel popular unrest – the rhetoric on immigration was either 
avoided  on  purpose  in  some  countries  and  regions  (Germany,  namely),  almost  like  a 
taboo that once uttered would despoil the official image of the so-defined-local or ethnic 
society,  (Faist,  1994),  either  already  very  much  present  in  the  public  discourse  of 
politicians with its negative representations of the other and otherness (Van der Valk, 
2003); and all this all throughout the 80s and 90s. Therefore, we can reasonably affirm 
that the tendency to negatively present the others as immigrants is a classic – possibly as 
old as human society itself defined as a large group of people that see themselves as a 
“we” opposed to one or multiple “they”s, with mini-groups within larger groups, the 
obvious  and  inevitable  multiple  overlappings  and  so  on  –  and within the European 
context it was definitely already present before the recent turn of millennia. The times 
that followed after 2000 didn’t change the way immigrants are seen and portrayed in any 
significant way, they just intensified the concern with them, bringing their problematic 
more into the focus of the mainstream lens. 
Even at an institutional level, works that analyze the European legal framework 
for  immigration  from  the  90s  state  that  the  matter  was  already  cause  for  serious 
contestations and tensions,  going  as  far  as  naming  the  negotiation  and 
intergovernmental institutional arrangements and processes a cacophony (Helga Leitner, 
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1997). Things were already heated in the cultural geography of western states at a time 
when the EU enlargement made them face (and construct) one of their greatest fears: 
the  immigrant  invasion.  The  failure  to  build  a  coherent  supranational  framework  for 
dealing  with  immigration  (which  Leitner’s  analysis  points  out)  came  not  only  from 
bureaucratic complications and the difficulties that usually arise from vast paperwork, 
but also from the confusion that is posed by a fear that strikes different countries on 
uneven levels. Also, as we’ll argue below in this paper, dealing with the concept of the 
immigrant imposes a quite uncomfortable level of ambivalence. Of course the matter 
couldn’t be settled among the countries forming the EU as well as some other matters 
which seemed to be settled in return. Still, the fact that a big fuss was already being 
made about immigrants in the 90s only proves our point further: the way these others 
were seen hasn’t changed and was always problematic, but the post 2000s enlargement 
of the EU and the 2008 economic crisis were two key moments that intensified these 
concerns, making a more palpable and present threat out of the idea of an immigrant.  
Of course, matters of a perceived superiority of the west (shared by both the 
west and the east in its inferiority complex, at least at an European scale) can be brought 
into account to further justify these strong reactions to the idea of immigration. But since 
the issue is such a classic and self-evident concept that it became a commonplace (an 
idea which was practically summarized in the first part of Roger Scruton’s work from 
2003, though centered at a global scale, thus including the Americas and the Middle East 
and focusing on their dynamic), we feel that any explanation based on this cultural bias 
would be too facile and self-sufficient. Such cultural politics and tendencies are of course 
ever present and involved in how immigration is perceived both in the west and the east 
of Europe (according to Seidman, 1994, the thesis of western superiority over the rest is 
a  direct  consequence  of  the  Enlightment  and  lies  at  the  very  core  of  European  and 
American civilization), but our proposed analysis chooses to focus on other, less obvious 
aspects  of  these  dynamics,  in  order  to  have  a  chance  to  produce  a  somewhat  fresh 
perspective on these matters. 
So  what  exactly  happened  at  and  after  the  two  turning  points we suggested 
above and how did it directly impact the way eastern immigrants are perceived in the 
west? First of all, and predictably so, the enlargement of the European Union brought 
about larger immigration waves in the more economically developed western countries, 
and along with these new masses of people came reactions in these countries political 
display of discourse. As anxieties arose about these foreigners coming in unprecedented 
numbers, the political right wing was ready to comprise and voice these anxieties in a 
way targeted at gathering more supporters (and, of course, targeted at discrediting and 
delegitimizing the immigrants’ perceived allies, the political left, as stated also by Van der 
Valk, 2003). Thus, predictably, the discourse on immigrants focusing on negative and 
anxious messages intensified after the western countries suddenly became open to new 
waves of immigrants from eastern countries, following the successive enlargements of 
the  EU.  Sadly,  the  negative  representations  and  anxieties  on  the  topic  of  eastern 
immigrants did not remain solely at a discursive level, but took dubious practical forms in 
embodying regulations - which called for stronger border enforcements - and ambivalent 
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policies and practices of the European Union. From this point of view, the EU paints itself 
the curious and not very coherent portrait of a structure which on one hand preaches 
multiculturalism  and/or  inclusion,  and  on  the  other  hand  sets  restrictions  for  work 
migration and, most of all, financially supports eastern governments to set boundaries 
for their citizens targeted at discouraging them from leaving the country in order to head 
West (as shown by Henk van Houtom and Roos Pijpers, 2005).  
In a self-contradicting manner, the Western European authorities can’t seem to 
make up their minds: on one hand they belong to this grand communitarian project, they 
embody it more or less being bureaucrats of this legal meta-structure (the EU), on the 
other  hand  they  completely  dislike  and  try  to  prevent  its  consequences when those 
consequences are the free workforce flow within the enlarged community borders. Are 
they  just  trying  to  respond  to  populist  pressure,  to  satisfy  the  voters’  demands  by 
pleasing both the side that welcomes the inclusion, both the right-wing inclined citizens 
worried about the immigrants that are coming? Or does this ambivalence show a rather 
deeper shift and confusion not only in policies and at a technical level, but also at a meta 
level  of  philosophy,  namely  within  the  paradigm  of  multiculturalism? We are inclined 
towards the latter, and believe that the concept is currently struggling with itself as 
people  are  faced  more  and  more  with  the  reality  of  what  it  means  to  apply  it.  The 
following course of events can only clarify how exactly will multiculturalism shift: will it 
become useless, a shell of a political idea with no actual back up, eventually dying out 
(less likely, in our opinion), or will it shift and adapt in order to survive in a somewhat 
alleviated form (more probable)? These questions – which can only be highly rhetorical at 
this point – will get sorted out in the following unwinding of events, as the consequences 
of the economic crisis and of the great EU enlargement will continue to play themselves 
out. The possible future of multiculturalism will also be discusses in more detail in the last 
section of the paper. 
To be fair, we should detail further the two schematically mentioned ‘sides’ of the 
debate,  in  order  to  avoid  the  impression  that  the  two  are  somewhat  homogenous. 
Behind the multiculturalist side of the debate, the one which encourages immigration 
(often not necessarily stemming from a deep conviction or righteousness concerning the 
multiculturalist values), lies a variety of voices, from the hippie-like discourses preaching 
inclusion and peace to the pragmatic interests of corporations that welcome immigrants 
for their new and cheap flow of labor, consumer markets and so on. To this we could add 
the  political  interests  of  various  groups  derived  from  external  pressure  (like  needing 
more permissive immigration policies in order to qualify for certain funding or to gather 
more voters), the NGOs that focus specifically on improving the so-called integration of 
immigrants and so on. All these fragments of interests advocating the liberal free flow 
and migration are then represented in public discourse by the liberal and neoliberal 
oriented parties (which may also include leftist interests as opposed to the right-wing 
discourse), but this representation hardly means that the represented mass is 
homogenous even at the slightest. It’s hard to pinpoint the exact ingredients that are 
comprised in the pro-immigration mass, due to the complexity of the matter; but what is 
interesting is that the opposing side, the so-called right, seems to be a bit more 
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homogenous.  As  detailed  above  and  throughout  the  rest  of  the  paper,  the  right’s 
motivations towards wariness against immigrants are focused on very similar key points: 
either fear of the negative effects of migration on the national economy, or the negative 
effects  of  migration  on  the  local  identity,  or  the  threat  posed  by  the  immigrants  to 
citizen’s security (expressed through the criminalization of the immigrant). All these will 
be detailed in the following sections of the paper. 
For theoretical variety purposes, it should be noted though that there are voices 
who argue against our current assumption that the anti-immigrant rhetoric has 
intensified  not  only  as  a  result  of  the  economic  crisis,  but  also  as  a  result  of  higher 
immigration rates. As an example, Thränhardt (1995) proposes an otherwise valuable 
analysis that points out an independence of xenophobic discourses relative to the actual 
number of immigrants, based on a collection of data from England, France and Germany. 
This independence of racist political discourses regarding migration of the numbers of 
immigrants the country is faced with is actually a key issue in Thränhardt’s paper, but this 
conclusion is attained mainly through comparison between the three countries. In other 
words, he reaches this conclusion noting that immigration rates between the three 
countries differ greatly and still they all experience xenophobia as a political discourse 
strategy, with ups and downs over the years. In our opinion, differences in numbers 
shouldn’t be enough to draw that conclusion, as specific cultural differences should also 
be taken into account. Just because a country is faced with few immigrants and still 
arbors xenophobic discourse doesn’t mean that the immigration wave, small as it was, 
wasn’t the trigger for this intensification of hate-speech. Maybe in the case of some 
countries,  with  their  own  constellation  of  specific  cultural  characteristics,  it  takes  a 
smaller spark to fire up a bonfire of anti-immigrant rhetoric. We can’t be sure of the 
opposite of what Thränhardt is arguing for, but we wouldn’t draw a conclusion mainly 
based  on  numeric  facts  (acknowledging  our  bias  towards  qualitative  approaches,  of 
course, while not desconsidering the valuable work of Thränhardt’s analysis and data 
collection). 
Meanwhile, in the symbolic economy of this paper, our assumption and thesis will 
remain that the two key moments that sparked up an intensification of anti-immigrant 
discourse in the Western countries were the post-2000 European Union enlargement 
waves and the economic crisis of 2008 (and an analysis performed below on the motives 
offered by Western xenophobic rhetorics will reveal why we believe this). Works like 
Joppke  (2004)  also  argue  that  initial  multucultural  poicies  were  met  with  great  civic 
tension, which made maintaining such policies highly problematic for the countries which 
harboured them in the first place. We believe that it was precisely these tensions that 
were a bit later confiscated and harnessed by right-wing parties in order to raise civic 
support to their own political agendas. 
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The creation of motives and rationalizations 
Classic psychology states that decisions and opinions are formed emotionally, while the 
rationalizations  and  motives  that  back  them  up  are  a  second-stage act, somewhat 
artificially constructed, that comes to justify something already settled otherwise. In this 
view, offering motives for one’s actions and opinions is merely a way to reduce one’s 
internal  cognitive  dissonance,  giving  others  (and  self)  the  impression  of  reason  and 
logical  judgment.  In  the  words  of  Elliot  Aronson,  the  father  of  cognitive  dissonance 
studies, “Man likes to think of himself as a rational animal. However, it is truer that man is 
a rationalizing animal, that he attempts to appear reasonable to himself and to others. 
Albert Camus even said that man is a creature who spends his entire life in an attempt to 
convince himself that he is not absurd” (from Psychology Today magazine, May 1973, 
reprinted in Leavitt, Pondy and Boje, 1989, p 134). This statement – and the theoretical 
view it embodies – was generally accepted in studies that deal with the way we think and 
continues to be the dominant paradigm today.  
Thus, when we speak of motives given to justify a political position – like the 
propaganda against immigration –  we  should  keep  in  mind  that  although  political 
positions  may  seem  (and  want  to  seem)  logical  and  based  on  cold  hard  facts  and 
objective necessities, psychology tells us that most probably the justifications offered are 
but mere rationalizations to back up an otherwise emotional state of mind. The very 
concept of “emotional state of mind” might seem like a paradox, but thought science 
says that it defines the mental reality for the whole of humanity. The political arena is of 
course  no  exception,  it  may  even  be  a  place  where  various  passions  are  even  more 
employed and expressed than in and through other mediums.  
Our hypothesis on the matter at stake here is that the right-wing anti-immigrant 
discourse is simply an elaborate rationalizing justification of a strong emotional reaction 
to outsiders (territoriality, anxiety, fear, xenophobia and so on).  
Moving on to exactly how rationalizations and motives are formed, it should be 
taken into account that there are multiple ways through which people construct their 
motives and through which they present they motives. One very important such path is 
narrative thought, where a story line is used both for justifying the position assumed and 
for  presenting  those  motives  to  an  implied  audience  for  persuasion  purposes.  As 
previously shown by Cihodariu (2012), narratives as mental constructs are one of the 
main  ways  of  defining  and  socially  constructing  one’s  reality  (by  which  it  is  to  be 
understood something of a similar acception to the classic concept of Lebenswelt), in 
ways that go beyond classic story-lines,  semiotics  or  linguistics.  In  the  case  of  anti-
immigrant  discourses,  the  narratives  employed  are  usually  either  the  ones  that 
criminalize the immigrant, the transient other, either the ones that victimize the native, 
the  local  (who  will  be  either  outnumbered  and  replaced  culturally  and  eventually 
biologically, either left without a job by the immigrant willing to work for a miserable 
wage). But more on such scenarios and the way they’re presented below, at the 
discourse analysis section.  
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Not least, we should consider how motives are given, especially in the context of 
political discourses and attitudes which interests us here. Obviously, motives are never 
presented outside the intension  to  persuade,  to  convince  an  auditory  of  the 
righteousness of the cause defended and sustained; and this statement couldn’t be truer 
than in a political context, where persuasion is the main purpose of any public speech or 
display. Although, as stated above, motives are born as a secondary rationalization of 
pre-existing emotions, they are presented in order to convince, to convert, to seduce, to 
bring over to the presenter’s position. This is especially intensified in politics where the 
pressure to gain votes and public sustainers is higher than in any other context of public 
life (but one should also bear in mind that, as we will further detail below, this propensity 
for persuasion goes beyond the conscious intent of this or that political actor and is 
intrinsic to language itself). 
Of course, the next question that arises from here is whether the anti-immigrant 
emotionality exists in the political leaders and they rationalize it, convince more followers 
and so on; or this emotionality exists actually in the voters who in consequence become 
more  inclined  to  radical  positions,  and  since  demand  creates  offer  in  capitalistic  and 
democratic systems, the politicians who can respond to this demand are thus created 
and promoted. In other words, who was immigrant-wary first: the right-wing in its more 
abstract form, or the people looking for a political direction to shield them from their 
perceived threats (the waves of immigration)? As interesting as this matter might be 
(and  intuitively  our  bet  would  be  that  the answer to this question is most probably 
somewhere  in  the  middle),  it  is  less  relevant  today,  when  the  masses  of  right-wing 
supporters are pretty compact and the anti-immigrant rhetoric quite established in the 
Western European which are countries facing high immigration rates. 
A few case studies and examples (discourse analysis) 
The disparate example we are about to present here in an effort to back our statements 
with empirical data are not part of some large-scale research systematically done on 
political discourses, but only examples that illustrate the trends of political thought and 
civic tensions that we described. The selection of data was based on relevance for our 
paper’s main theme, as well as the size of the debate which was sparked by the right-
wing discourse we analyzed. The bigger the debate and the better known the campaign 
in the general European (especially West-European) political landscape, the more likely 
we were to discuss it here. 
One of the political campaigns that most negatively impressed the supporters of a 
multiculturalist view was the anti-immigrant campaign led by the conservative SVP party 
from Switzerland in 2011, when the country was preparing for a EU-induced wave of 
immigration. The motives offered by the party that initiated this campaign (going as far 
as including a gathering of signatures for organizing a national referendum targeted at 
stopping mass immigration coming via the EU) were the following: “overfilled streets 
and trains, exploding rents and land prices, salaries under pressure, misuse of asylum and 
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an increase in foreign criminality”3, all being consequences of uncontrolled migration, 
allegedly. The ideas employed in these motives are that immigrants are a threat to the 
local comfort (because apparently they’ll come in such numbers as to flood the streets 
and the trains), a threat to the local economy (their demand making the land and rent 
prices go up), a threat to the local job system (being implied that they’re willing to work 
more for less, endangering the salarization level of the natives), a potential source of 
fraud  and  cheating  (misuse  of  asylum)  and  a  threat  to  the  society  itself  since  the 
immigrants are a source of criminality. All these motives are both accusations (equating 
immigrant with criminal, for  example)  and  narratives,  since  they  create  story-like 
scenarios (the streets will be crowded, the rent and land prices will go up etc).  
In March 2013, the German interior minister, Hans-Peter  Friedrich,  spoke  out 
against  immigrants  coming  from  Eastern  Europe, expressing yet again the country’s 
opposition of Romania and Bulgaria being included in the Schengen agreement. This 
attitude  of  disapproval  of  immigration  from  these  two  countries  to  the  West  has 
received support from the French and Dutch governments as well. The motives offered 
by  the  German  officials  to  justify  this  stand are  the  following:  free  circulation  would 
cause a surge of “economic refugees” intending to live on the welfare state4, a wave of 
briberies  from  individuals  attempting  to  enter  western countries in corrupt ways, 
Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in some cities (like Duisburg, as its mayor agued) 
caused a spike in robberies, prostitution, gang-violence and “mountains of rubbish”5 and 
so on. Again, the motives offered are both accusations regarding what these eastern 
people are in the present (criminals and parasites) and narratives regarding what they 
will also be in the future (projecting the same panic-inducing scenarios). 
An interesting example is also provided by the recent British campaign that was 
considered by the government as part of an effort to keep Romanians and Bulgarians out 
of the country for next year (2014) when the work restrictions are set to expire. The 
motives that would be offered by the British officials were targeted not at their citizens, 
but directly at the potential immigrants: messages like “don’t come to Britain, the jobs 
are scarce and low-paid” were considered to keep the immigrants at bay6. But even 
formulated in this reverse rhetoric, the scenarios are not hard to distinguish and look 
very similar to the scenarios the rest of the western countries: when the last wall falls, 
the people from the East side of Europe are going to assault us with waves of economic 
migration; we must halt their quest for our money. The same “under siege” feeling of 
3 According to the Swiss News Portal “The Local”, “Swiss conservatives split by immigration campaign” 
online story, accessed April 27th 2013, at the following link: 
http://www.thelocal.ch/page/view/791#.UYr6FEpqgjg 
4 According to World Socialist Website, online story, accessed April 25th 2013, at the following link: 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/03/11/immi-m11.html 
5 According to The Dailymail news portal, online story, accessed April 27th 2013, at the following link: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2287852/Romania-Bulgaria-WONT-join-EU-passport-free-zone-
Germany-vows-veto-Schengen-bid-corruption-fears.html 
6 According to The Guardian news portal, online story, accessed April 27th 2013, at the following link: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jan/27/uk-immigration-romania-bulgaria-ministers 
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Western populations and their representatives is perceptible every such campaign and 
political stand on the matter of immigration. 
What  all  of  these  examples  have  in  common  is  the  criminalization  of  the 
immigrant and the victimization of the native (who has to stand by helplessly and watch 
how a horde of nomadic barbarians come and rampage through their country, with EU’s 
permission). This is the main narrative and scenario that stands at the base of all anti-
immigrant discourses of West European countries that seem to feel under siege. Since 
the fears that come up almost obsessively in such campaigns are mostly on financial 
nature (they will take our jobs, they will live on our welfare, they will cause prices to go 
up) and only second of all regarding criminality, we can safely argue that the rejection of 
immigrants intensified not only because the free internal migration within EU caused 
greater numbers of people coming to the West, but also because of the 2008 financial 
crisis that suddenly made things seem scarce even for the citizen of the rich occidental 
countries. 
The irony is that while the European Union’s enlargement has caused a 
radicalization of the right-wing discourse in the West (since those countries were faced 
with greater immigration waves, stirring their potential for xenophobia and rattling their 
anxieties on the matter), it caused quite the opposite in the East: according to 
Vachudova (2008), accession to the EU induced an at least temporary moderation in the 
political agendas and discourses of all major parties in candidate states. In the particular 
case  of  right-wing  parties  that  were  known  to  casually  sport  ultra-nationalist and 
xenophobic messages, the years around the accession brought a tempering down of the 
radical discourses of such parties in Eastern Europe. The pressure to comply to European 
standards in order to make the country look good enough just before official accession 
is, obviously, the main factor of this sudden calm. The 2008 financial crisis unfortunately 
caused a revival of far right tendencies in those countries (especially in Hungary with its 
Jobbik movement which is now the country’s third largest party, eliminating their liberal 
completion  in  20097),  but  overall  eastern  countries  still  can’t  afford  the  chauvinistic 
discourse their western counterparts display more and more daringly as they’re faced 
with increasing dread towards immigration waves. 
Offering motives against the transient other (the immigrant) 
Kenneth Burke, a classic critic and author on the rhetoric of motives, claimed that any 
human activity, language-expressed or not (but especially true in case of linguistic acts), 
is not only a symbolic affair, but also one of persuasion. His concept of “symbolic action” 
defined the human being as a creature that employs symbols (especially linguistic means 
of expression) – using and sometimes misusing them – in order to persuade, to mystify, 
to convince and to seduce a present or absent auditory (Burke, 1969). In his view, any 
human act –  speech  most  of  all,  obviously  – is  specifically  targeted  and  designed  to 
persuade, and most often than not this target is a conscious one. His views couldn’t find 
7 According to the European Elections Database, 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/hungary/parliamentary_elections.html 
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more  truthfulness  than  in  the  sphere  of  political  discourse.  Considering  that  Burke’s 
background was mainly in semiotics, the bluntness of his views on the purposefulness 
and omnipresence of persuasion within any discourse (and any human act, actually) gives 
considerable weight to the implications of his studies. In the case of this paper’s focus, 
such  implications  of  Burke’s  work  are  the  following:  offering  motives  to  justify  anti-
immigrant positions and actions is specifically targeted to persuade, but in deeper ways 
than one might expect at a first glance. The persuasion intended does not just mean to 
justify actions, to convince of the truthfulness of one’s proposed political agenda or legal 
measures (as we could expect when we first think of offering motives), but to persuade 
at  a  deeper  level,  something  closer  to  the  meaning  of  education rather than simple 
persuasion. Such speeches that offer motives against the immigrant don’t just mean to 
justify measures against the immigrant, they mean to teach the population to hate or at 
least dislike the immigrant.  
We realize that this might sound ridiculously close to conspiracy theories, but our 
intended  meaning  is  far  from  it.  We  didn’t  claim  the  political  actor’s  intention  is  to 
reeducate  the  listeners  into  developing  strong  negative  emotions  towards  the 
immigrant. No, we claimed that was the discourse’s purpose, beyond any intentionality 
one could attribute to the political actor and political people themselves. As postmodern 
critical theory has shown, language does have an autonomy and intentionality of its own 
(see especially Derrida’s works commented in Mckenna, 1992). The impulse to that kind 
of  deeper  persuasion  which  we  equated  to  a  form  of  education  (as  any  culturally 
significant act is prone to do, actually) resides in language itself and its “symbolic action” 
nature,  as  Burke  would  put  it.  Offering  motives  for  anti-immigrant attitudes and 
measures is not only a battle for deciding immediate action, as things are usually put; it’s 
a battle for shaping views on the matter of immigration and views on the social world in 
general (a battle for shaping a specific Lebenswelt, in other words), whether the actors 
making use of the language are conscious of this or not. And this is even more true 
considering the psychological tensions involved in such a delicate matter as how to feel 
about the immigrant, an issue to which a society’s attitude is automatically a confused 
and mixed range of competing internal tendencies. 
Though most of the reasons offered against immigration do harbor a cloak of 
pragmatic explanations, related to concern about the economy, the internal market, the 
wages  and  growth  of  the  internal  country  and  other  number  and  figures-backed 
rationalizations (as for example see Friedberg and Hunt, 1995), they all seem to conceal a 
deep-seated unrest and fear of the immigrant other. Sometimes, this fear takes the uglier 
discourse form of criminalizing the other through over-generalizations and downright 
xenophobic examples from the present or close past and concerns about the immediate 
future. What seems to be the constant in all this is that all the rationalizations offered 
against immigrants are based on a strange mix of various fears, even when cloaked in 
apparent practical reason. When that meets the motives offered by the same practical 
reason in favor of immigration (the need for either lowly skilled or highly skilled workers, 
or workers for a specific sector which is uncovered by the local workforce etc.), the 
result seems to be a strange discursive ambivalence. 
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The western attitude towards the eastern migrant cannot but be an ambivalent 
one.  One  of  the  direct  consequences  of  this  intrinsic  ambivalence  is  the  increased 
amount of tension and controversy caused by expressing statements on the matter if 
immigration, either in support or against. The conflicts and struggles and controversies 
always take place internally: within the country’s public sphere, within the political party 
that  initiated  the  campaign  against  immigration  (like  the  2011  Swiss  campaign  of  the 
country’s conservatives, for instance), within the self, actually. Andrew Geddes (2003) 
pinpoints how this ambivalence is actually inherent to the self-structure and the very 
foundation of Western European nation-states: on one hand liberal, on the other hand 
quite  chauvinistic  and  ethno-centrist.  This  duality  then  reflects especially in the 
incoherence of policies regarding immigration (according to Geddes, 2003, p 22-23). 
In this issue of ambivalence towards immigration, what makes matters even more 
emotionally difficult is the specific otherness of this specific other, the immigrant. Classic 
anthropology shows how difficult is to relate and show empathy to the other per se, but 
in the case of the eastern immigrant, matters are subtly more complicated, we would 
say. First of all, the other who comes from Eastern Europe isn’t that much of a foreigner, 
he’s still European after all (the media often employs the metaphor of the “poor cousins 
from the East” to describe them or their countries, accentuating this distant relation 
character). Thus, this other has a sort of dimmed otherness about him that makes him 
difficult to really fear and hate without feeling conflicted about it. But on the other hand 
(second of all), this other isn’t a representative of alterity that necessarily comes to stay, 
he is perceived as on the move – we hear the phrase “mobile people in a mobile world” 
at every corner when talking about migration – which makes him less worthy of being 
taken into consideration than an other one actually has to live with. The migrant isn’t the 
permanent neighbor who for some reason is different in matters of sexual orientation, 
color or religion, making him “the other”. No, the migrant is the other who is passing by 
continuously, one towards whom no efforts of getting accustomed with are required, 
since he’ll move on anyway. The immigrant is a transient other, an other without a face, 
similar to the barbaric nomads that just come and pillage through the resources a land 
has to offer before passing by in search of some other distant land to pillage next (this 
fairytale-ish scenario is actually highly implied and used in anti-immigrant rhetorics if one 
pays  attention  to  their  narratives).  Of  course,  as  shown  by  Hraba,  Hagendoorn  and 
Hagendoorn (1989), the social distance felt by a society towards this other embodied in 
the immigrant varies in relation to the immigrant’s background and is even organized in a 
consensual  hierarchy  (for  example,  the  less  distance  felt  towards  immigrants  from 
Eastern Europe in comparison to the distance felt towards immigrant from the Middle 
East, discussed above). 
This transient other, an other to whom it is thus increasingly difficult to relate to 
because of his or her perceived transient and temporary status, calls for understanding 
and  acceptance  from  the  official  ideology’s  (which  is,  at  the  time, multiculturalism) 
standing point, but also threatens the internal comfort and well-being of the so-called 
natives. Henk van Houtum (2003) points out that even from a strictly utilitarian point of 
view, the attitude towards the immigrant is a highly ambivalent one: this outsider is a 
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delicate  and  unstable  mix  of  both  desirability  and  undesirability,  a  mix  and  an 
ambivalence which are visible including at the policy level. The desirability in case is for a 
specifically-skilled workforce that is scheduled to preserve the local economic stability 
and  comfort  in  the  future,  either  by  providing  cheap  unskilled  labor  or  highly  skilled 
expertise and innovation from brilliant immigrants, the best that each poor country has 
to offer (an exodus usually called “the brain-drain” from east to west). The undesirability 
is, of course, but the other side of the coin: along with the good come the bad: the 
surplus  workforce,  the  threat  to  the  native  workers  that  demand  more  pay  and  are 
perhaps cast aside by potential employers looking for the cheapest labor the job market 
can offer, the unemployed immigrants living in improper conditions in improvised camps, 
the occasional criminality and so on. Both desirability and undesirability in this context 
are means to the same end: protecting the own internal comfort zone (van Houtum, 
2003). In spite of the meaningful and moving official messages of multiculturalism that 
promotes,  in  a  way,  the  contemporary  reinterpretation  of  humanist  values,  the  real 
motor of how things are done is in fact cold hard economic interest. But how can the 
selfish need for selective immigration (that logically derives from this mix of desirability 
and undesirability) be reconciled with the need for a morally acceptable discourse (like 
the one that the current official ideology, multiculturalism, still provides)? The answer is 
that the two can’t really be perfectly reconciled, or at least not yet. Hence the apparent 
crisis within multiculturalism that we seek to explore here. 
Is multiculturalism still on? 
The  results  of  this  above-discussed  ambivalence  are  contradictory  policies  that 
sometimes  seem  to  strangely  mirror  the  practices  of  the  pre-‘70s  “guestworker” 
programs,  a  resemblance  that  may  lead  to  similar  negative  effects  on  all  countries 
involved in the new migration flows (both on the giving and the receiving end), as argued 
in Castles, 2006. All in all, it really doesn’t seem like the best approach to the changes 
engendered  by  the  increasingly  globalized  flows  of  people.  By  mirroring  some  of  its 
previously closed programs and policies, Western Europe seems to chase around its tail, 
not knowing or not being able to decide how to deal with the new mobility situation. All 
the while, The United States are apparently taking advantage of the irrational migration 
policies of Europe, getting the most skilled and innovative immigrants, while Europe ages 
and its fertility rates are at a historical low. These trends are sure to have a negative long-
term impact on the future of Europe (argues Alesina, 2006, p 11-12). In this not-so-rosy 
context, debates on the role and future of multiculturalism are prone to appear – and 
already do. 
It is already a common place in certain EU countries to argue that multiculturalism 
is already dead and buried or just another name for a well-known saying according to 
which the road to hell is paved with good intentions. It is the kind of reasoning that 
throws  the  water  with  the  baby.  The  aim  of  our  article  is  not  to  take  the  pulse  of 
nowadays multiculturalism, but to understand how in a multicultural milieu, as the one 
specific to old European democracies, certain xenophobic discourses, especially the ones 
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directed towards immigrants, still subsist. But before we tackle the philosophical content 
of  multiculturalism,  we  should  take  a  rapid  look  at  the  initial  aim  of  multiculturalist 
policies. Devised in the 70s and propelled by astute slogans, such as “cultural solutions to 
cultural  problems”,  multiculturalist  policies  sought  to  improve  the  social  status  of 
second-generation migrants, who might have felt unwanted, oppressed by state racism 
or  excluded  by  labor  market  on  ethnic  criteria.  From  a  philosophical  perspective, 
multiculturalist policies emerged after the turn in the liberal discourse from “orthodox 
liberal” to “liberal pluralist” (Kymlicka, 2001). “Orthodox liberal”, which was the most 
prominent line of approaching diversity after WWII, relegated ethnocultural diversity to 
the private sphere. It was extricated from this realm by “liberal pluralist”, a rectified 
version of liberalism according to which justice required a thorough public recognition of 
ethnocultural  diversity.  Obviously,  supplanting  “orthodox  liberal”  views  by  “liberal 
pluralist” perspectives  represented an important leap with respect to rights granted to 
different minority groups. Apart from the fact that public policies’ scope got broadened, 
the welfare state, as the source of multiculturalist policies, continued to be propelled by 
the same ideology, namely social liberalism. In a recently published book, titled Social 
Resilience in the Neoliberal Era,  Will  Kymlicka  assesses  the  turn  in  the  multicultural 
discourse. This time from „liberal multiculturalism” to a “neoliberal multiculturalism”. 
Whilst liberal multiculturalism was about a “citizenization” process rooted both in social 
liberalism  (politics  of  redistribution)  and  nationalism  (creating  good  citizens  through 
politics  of  recognition),  neoliberal  multiculturalism  narrowed  its  scope  to  creating 
competitive  actors  in  competitive  economies  (Hall,  Lamont,  2013).  In  other words, 
neoliberal multiculturalism is not prone anymore to build a tolerant citizen but rather to 
construct  a  market  actor  who  can  perform  effectively  within  a  very  competitive 
transnational economic milieu. There is no doubt that multiculturalism is ineffective by 
attending only to citizenship status bereft of market status.  But would it be effective 
only by attending to market status with no regard to citizenship status? Of course not. 
Kymlicka stresses that multiculturalism is most effective when it takes into consideration 
both the citizenship status and the market status. Kymlicka’s differentiation between 
multicultural liberalism and multicultural neoliberalism is quite helpful, because different 
scholars have construed multicultural neoliberalism as the death of multiculturalism. 
Multiculturalism is often a misunderstood or misused term, due to the multiple 
terms  sometimes  used  to  describe  or  intuitively  hint  at  the  same  depicted  realities: 
multiculturalism, assimilation, integration, inclusion and so on. This kind of confusion may 
be not so troublesome when discussing the matter of multiculturalism from a strictly 
theoretical  perspective,  as  we  do  in  this  particular  section  of  the  paper,  but  it  can 
become dangerous when trying to understand the  specific  mechanisms  in  which 
multiculturalism or inclusion are defined, enforced and negotiated within a specific social 
context. As shown by Stalker, while multiculturalism is a broad worldview or perspective 
on the matter of immigration, the other terms used in relation to it are often actually 
referring to techniques or strategies of dealing with the outcome of multiculturalism:  
“Integration is a term which is used fairly loosely and often interchangeably with 
concepts such as assimilation and multiculturalism. For the purposes of this discussion it 
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is assumed that integration is an objective which can be achieved either by assimilation 
or by multiculturalism, or by a combination of the two. Assimilation of immigrants means 
dispersing them throughout the community and steadily absorbing them so that 
eventually  they  become  indistinguishable  from  a  homogenous  host  community. 
Multiculturalism means tolerating, or even promoting, ethnic and other differences in 
such a way that identifiable groups coexist and interact to produce a heterogeneous but 
stable society.” (Stalker, 1994, p 72).  
In Europe, argues Stalker, the great waves of immigration, the growth of ethnic 
communities and the public awareness of them “prompted two parallel responses. First, 
a clamp-down  on  further  immigration.  Second,  the  promotion  of  multicultural 
development  for  those  immigrants  already  in  place.”  (idem,  p  73).  This  dual  and 
somewhat contradictory response  (contradictory in opting for multiculturalism rather 
than the historical approach  of  assimilation)  could  be  a  possible  explanation  for  the 
ambivalence we discussed above in the paper. Furthermore, the author names France, 
Germany and Switzerland as the main countries reluctant – if not openly opposed – to 
multiculturalism (idem, p 74), a view which seems to be consistent with our opinion also 
and  with  the  case  examples  we  have  given  previously  to  illustrate  anti-immigrant 
rhetoric.  
The present section of our paper tries to explain why certain authors believe that 
multiculturalist policies have failed. A particular emphasis will be placed on the political 
content of multiculturalism, accused by some as being too liberal and, as a consequence, 
impossible  of  being  internalized  by  immigrant  people.  Other  perspectives  present 
multiculturalism as illiberal because it stresses pluralism whilst it simultaneously 
overlooks tolerance. Some authors have charged multiculturalism of concealing a rather 
particularistic stance instead of sharing a sheer universalistic one. And last, but not least, 
populism was considered to be the archenemy of multiculturalist policies. But before we 
start unraveling the political content of multiculturalism, we stress the fact that for the 
failure  of  multiculturalist  policies  immigrants  themselves  were  blamed.  Rod  Liddle, a 
British  columnist,  contended  that  the  Muslims  were  the  ones  “who  killed 
multiculturalism”  (Liddle,  2004)  This  is  the  type  of  recited  truth  which,  according  to 
Michel  De  Certeau,  furthers  the  intolerant  stance  toward  immigrant  people  by 
engendering social facts (De Certeau, 1984). Without dwelling too much upon Certeau’s 
theoretical perspective, it is worth saying that according to him a mass media dominated 
society has become a “forest of narratives”, a rather tortuous place, from which one is 
extracted by the rhetoric most conversant with her/his emotions. Especially in a social 
frame dominated by scarcity, Muslims in particular, and immigrants in general, become 
perfect  scapegoats  for  explaining  the  failure  of  multiculturalist  policies  and  thus  an 
outstanding example of what sociologists call perverse effects. Instead of widening and 
deepening the social awareness and tolerance towards immigrants coming to EU 
countries, multiculturalist policies have been assessed as rather overprotective, from a 
social  and  cultural  point  of  view,  with  the  newcomers,  who  were  thus  unwilling  to 
espouse  the  political  and  cultural  values  of  the  host  country.  In  other  words, 
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multiculturalist  policies  have  failed  to  forge  social  responsibility  and  constitutional 
loyalties among immigrants.  
Politics of redistribution and politics of recognition are just two consequences of 
the  multicultural  ethos  that  started  influencing  the  policy  making  sector  in  Western 
Europe in the 70s in order to produce a better social integration of sexual minorities, 
religious  minorities,  immigrants  and  national  minorities.  Politics  of  redistribution  is 
propelled by a Marxist way of understanding society, according to which one’s place in 
status hierarchy is strongly determined by his/her economic situation. But it is quite clear 
that status hierarchy is not completely synonimous with economic hierarchy. For 
instance, certain national minorities, like the Catalans or the Quèbècois, have the same 
living standard as the majority, but their culture doesn’t have the same social prominence 
as  the  majority’s  culture.  Whilst  the  traditional  working  class  needed  social  benefits 
engendered by politics of redistribution, gays and Jews with a solid position in the social 
hierarchy  asked  just  for  politics  of  recognition  (Kymlicka,  2002).  A  good  example  of 
combining  politics  of  redistribution  and  politics  of  recognition  is  that  of  women. 
Women’s social status needs to be rectified by both politics of redistribution and politics 
of recognition. But this is also the case of immigrants who usually need to engage in both 
politics of redistribution and politics of recognition. Basically, xenophobic rhetoric has 
approached, especially in times of scarcity, the politics of redistribution area in order to 
criticize the immigrants. Trying to understand the politics of recognition, and the critical 
stances built upon this particular outgrowth of multiculturalist policies, is an undertaking 
that sends us in the area of political philosophy. Giovanni Sartori, for instance, contends 
that the politics of recognition engenderd by multiculturalism has forged new cultures 
(Sartori, 2007) which disrespect a pluralist pre-existing social order. In a pluralist millieu, 
writes Sartori, cultures are prone to recognize each other, creating thus a social climate 
conducive to tolerance. When new cultures are manufactured and imposed from above 
without striving for mutual recognition so that the climate of tolerance be furthered, 
pernicious effects emerge. Sartori claims that the new cultures supported by politics of 
recognition have displayed just a „radical ignorance” (Sartori, 2007) towards the existing 
cultural  context,  and  thus  the  existing  pluralistic  millieu  and  its  specific  tolerance 
suffered deeply. It is quite clear that those who showed „radical ignorance” to a context 
presented as pluralistic and tolerant by Sartori assessed the cultural millieu differentely. 
However,  from  Sartori’s  perspective,  multiculturalist  policies  have  failed  to  nourish 
tolerance just because they haven’t place enough emphasis on efforts aimed at mutual 
recognition,  instilling  instead  a  „radical  ignorance”.  Unlike  Sartori,  who  accuses 
multiculturalist policies of little pluralist content because they have been too prone to 
positive  discrimination,  Liz  Fekete  claims that integration discourse in France, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Norway stresses the similarity between integration 
and cultural homogeneity. In the above mentioned countries, the integration discourse 
has been guided by the superiority of „Western morals” and national identity values, 
whilst laying to much emphasis on religious-cultural terms and too little on socio-
economic  ones  (Fekete,  2008).  This  is  a  type  of  Schmittian  liberalism  that  hinges  on 
certain civilizational values, which are allegedly afflicted by Muslim immigrants especially 
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after 9/11, and wich imbues the integration discourse with a Huntingtonian perspective 
that entails dire consequences. Consequently, integration discourse is not about whether 
to integrate migrants. It’s about how to integrate them (Lentin, 2011). This is how 
multiculturalist  policies  end  up  forging  cultural  racism.  Another  explanation  for  why 
multiculturalist policies haven’t worked refers to populism. As an “empty hart” ideology 
(Taggart, 2000), populism emerged in the mid-1990s, when Western Europe was coping 
with the geopolitical disappearance of USSR, potential threats brought by globalization 
processes propelled by the neo-liberal philosophy, the reinstatement of politics and the 
weakening of political economy etc. New populism’s main tenet refers to a widening 
cleavage  between  a  corrupt  elite  and  a  pure  people.  Being  inclined  to  idealize  “the 
people”, populism tends to fend off everything that is not related to a certain people’s 
ethos. But this ethos is not a traditional one, as our reader might have expected, but 
rather a postmodern one, nourished by values which were brought in the limelight by the 
politics of recognition. What is definitely not characteristic to “the peoples of Europe” 
are especially the Muslim values, which strongly reject, among others, sexual freedom. 
Revolving around an assertive liberalism, this type of populism considers every cultural 
code that restrains personal autonomy as deviant. Thus, gender equality become the 
central value of a neo-nationalism (with Pim Fortuyn as a political icon) that makes a 
limpid distinction between pre-modern values that can be saved and anti-modern values 
which  are  to  be  externalized  (Mamdani,  2005).  Further  on,  we  argue  that  willy-nilly 
multiculturalism policies have a strong particularistic content. David Miller claims that 
there is a false contrast between genuine identities forged by multiculturalist policies and 
an artificial national identity (Miller, 1995). Miller argues that group identities of any type 
could be artificial. In other words, the smaller the social group, the more genuine its 
identity, is just a false contention. He also contends that micro-groups and their particular 
identity tend to be very fragile outside national milieu, which makes national culture a 
protective umbrella for micro-identities. Continuing Miller’s reasoning, we say that most 
of the injustices inflicted on group members take place inside a particular group. Which 
means that the sufferings caused inside a group needs to be rectified by some central 
institution which disseminates in the whole society a common meaning of justice and 
fairness. David Miller’s arguments are philosophically tapped on by Pierre Manent, who 
considers that the European Union’s most urgent  task  is  to  define  itself  politically 
(Manent, 2006). Employing classical liberal reasoning, Manent believes that politics is 
about putting things in common, like a territory and a population. Politics is also about 
limitations, such as the jurisdiction of a particular institution. Placing too much emphasis 
on individual rights rather than on citizen rights, hoping that the state would survive the 
nation-state and constantly detaching its institutions from the European peoples (this 
time defined in a modern sense) and thus thinning self-governance, the European Union 
understood as a “permanent public authority” (Vincent, 1987) will become less and less 
democratic. According to Manent, what post-Maastricht European Union has so far failed 
to create is a political body, which usually puts certain things in common. To sum it up, 
we argue that it is premature to talk about the death of multiculturalism. This is the 
cultural dream of the European Union. But in order to make it work, European Union 
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needs to define itself politically, namely to clarify what populations and territories are or 
could be considered European. In other words, an European multiculturalism needs to be 
defined  and  enforced,  if  the  EU  intends  to  become  a  coherent  geopolitical  block. 
Animated just by an international multiculturalism, it will be very hard for the EU to get 
over  an  economic  crisis  and  the  scarcity  it  causes,  and  multicultural  policies  and 
immigrants will once again be considered liable for an economic havoc caused by too 
much economics and too little politics. And neoliberal multiculturalism, which currently 
inspires the multiculturalist policies adopted by the most developed EU countries, is the 
salient expression of this lack of equilibrium between economics and politics.  
A short conclusion 
Sadly, as Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulou (2013) have shown, the nationalist and 
civic values of right-wing parties – that often take pride in posing as the last defenders of 
a  country’s  specific  authenticity  –  not  only  fail  to  shield  countries  from  radicalism, 
extremism and xenophobia (as the conventional view in the study of nationalism likes to 
believe), but even make these unpleasant attitudes flourish under the appearance of 
deploying the most beloved symbolic resources of national identity.  
Thus, one could infer that the right-wing parties in Western Europe arbor dubious 
attitudes and messages and incite to open discrimination of the eastern-born transient 
other (the immigrant). What is interesting to learn from this is, first of all, how motives to 
justify these attitudes are constructed and offered (and how they’re based on scenarios 
that criminalize the other and victimize the native in order to persuade and promote 
these radical attitudes); and second of all how these stirs and shifts translate into shifts 
within  the  broader  frame  of  the  (still)  humanist  Europe’s  official  ideology: 
multiculturalism. 
Motives  given  against  immigration  are  always  not  just  what  they  define 
themselves to be, which is rationalizations or reasonable concerns regarding the effect 
of  allowing  immigration  waves  to  sweep  the  home  country.  Behind  any  such 
rationalization – and we’re not at all denied the validity of such factual reasons offered – 
lies an often emotional and identity-related worldview that is fundamental to the way the 
receiving countries (in this case the countries from Western Europe) see themselves, 
their role and the way they define their nation and statehood. Within the limits and 
purposes of this paper, we have chosen to focus on these underlying views, while not 
attempting to deny or belittle the rational and factual analysis they sometimes engender. 
These ideas should be taken into account when discussing the more technical aspects 
related to policies and the welfare state’s organization, because “the ideas that animate 
these  practices  (about  the  nation  and  about  membership  of  the  imagined  national 
community) are of central importance” (Geddes, 2003, p 23). A rationalizing motive is 
never just a motive, which is precisely why such ethno-centric backed arguments often 
give way to forms of discourse very similar to hate speech. 
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